The problems and pitfalls in the appointment of insolvency practitioners in South African Insolvency Law by Buthelezi, Lungile Cynthia
COPYRIGHT AND CITATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS THESIS/ DISSERTATION 
o Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if
changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that
suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
o NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
o ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your
contributions under the same license as the original.
How to cite this thesis 
Surname, Initial(s). (2012). Title of the thesis or dissertation (Doctoral Thesis / Master’s 
Dissertation). Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Available from: 
http://hdl.handle.net/102000/0002 (Accessed: 22 August 2017).    
 
 
 
 
THE PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS IN THE APPOINTMENT OF 
INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS IN SOUTH AFRICAN INSOLVENCY 
LAW 
 
 
By Lungile Cynthia  Buthelezi 
Student number: 215053785 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
MASTER OF LAWS 
 
in 
  
CORPORATE LAW 
 
in the  
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
 
at the 
 
UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR JUANITTA CALITZ 
 
 
2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
I would like to express my profound gratitude to Professor J. Calitz for her assistance and guidance 
with this dissertation. 
 
I also like to thank my Managers in Legal Services, Ms Kedibone Mashaba, and Ms Julia Serumula 
for believing, and encouraging me that I can do this.  
 
I also express my gratitude to my family, my friends, in particular Aneli Mtshali, Zamani 
Ntombela, and Simisiwe Mtshali for their tremendous support.  
 
Finally, all the glory to the Lord.
i 
 
Table of Contents 
Part 1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………..  1 
1.1 Research Statement……………………………………………………………………………….   3 
1.2    Chapter overview…………………………………………………………………………..…......   4 
Part 2 The current appointment practice of Insolvency Practitioners in South Africa………….....   5 
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………    5 
2.2 Appointments in terms of the Statutory criteria…………………………………………………..   6 
2.2.1    Appointments by the Master of the in terms of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 ………………..   6 
2.2.1.1     Commentary on section 18 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 …………………………………   7 
2.2.2   Appointments by the Master in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973……………………….   8 
2.2.2.1   Commentary on section 368 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973……………………………….   8 
2.3 Appointments in terms of the Non-Statutory criteria ……………………………………………   9 
2.3.1   The Master’s panel …………………………….………………………………………. ………   9 
2.3.2   The Requisition system …………………………………………………………………………   9 
2.3.3    Appointments in terms of the Ministerial Policies and Strategies ………………….................  10    
2.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................  11 
Part 3 An analysis of the South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Associations  
judgments (SARIPA case) …………………………………………………………………….   12 
3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..……….   12 
3.2 The relevant facts in the SARIPA case………………………………………………………….   12 
3.2.1   The failed Ministerial Policy……………………......……………………………….................   13 
3.2.2 Constitutional challenge ………………………………………………………………………   14 
3.3       The High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal, and Constitutional Court judgments ……………..   15 
3.4 Commentary on the SARIPA case ………..…………………………………………….………   19 
3.5 Commentary on other aspects of the Policy which led to its constitutional invalidity .………...   21 
3.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….....…..………..  23 
Part 4 The International Regulatory Framework ………………………………………….……….  24 
4.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….......................   24 
4.2 World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regime……......………...   24 
4.3 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Legislative Guide.......   26 
4.3.1  The Insolvency Representative…………………………………………....................................   26 
4.4 Considerations of the South Africa insolvency laws against the international Standards ……....  28 
4.5 Comparison of the South African system with international standards…………………………..   29 
4.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….  30 
 
Part 5   Criticism against the previous and current appointment system ………………………….   31 
5.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………..   31 
5.2 Problems relating to the Statutory criteria for appointments……………………………………..   31 
5.3 Problems relating to the Master’s unguided discretion……………………………….................   32 
5.4 Problems relating to the Master’s panel………………………………………………………….   32 
5.5 Problems relating to the Requisition system..................................................................................   33 
5.6 Problems relating to the Ministerial Policies and Strategies ……………………………………   33 
5.7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………....   34 
Part 6  Conclusion and Recommendations for consideration by policy makers ………………….    35 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………………….....  37
1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
For decades, the appointment of insolvency practitioners by the Master of the High Court of South 
Africa (Master) has been subject to scholarly debates.1 The inception of the Insolvency Act 24 of 
1936 (Insolvency Act) marked the era in which the Master was assigned the power to appoint the 
trustees.2 Prior to the Insolvency Act, the Insolvency Act 32 of 1916 (1916 Act) originally 
regulated the administration of insolvent estates. The 1916 Act empowered the court to appoint the 
provisional trustees before the appointment of the final trustees.3 One of the important 
developments brought about by the Insolvency Act, was the provisions that conferred on the 
Master the discretionary powers to make the provisional, and in certain circumstances, the final 
appointments of trustees, and co-trustees.4 In addition to the powers conferred by the Insolvency 
Act, the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (Companies Act) conferred the Master with powers to appoint 
a provisional liquidator, and if necessary, to appoint a co-liquidator in respect of a compulsory or 
voluntary winding up of a company.5 However, both legislations do not stipulate the procedure 
that must be followed in the appointments process,6 save for stipulating the conditions for 
disqualifications from being appointed,7 and that the appointments must be in accordance with a 
policy determined by the Minister. Although the Companies Act prescribes that the Master must 
appoint a ‘suitable person’ as the provisional liquidator,8 it also does not provide a criteria to 
determine the suitability of the appointee.  
 
According to Calitz, the provisional appointments of trustees and liquidators were meant to be 
extraordinary appointments, meaning that it was not the intention that such appointments to be 
                                                          
1 Calitz “Some thoughts on state regulation of South African insolvency law” 2011 De Jure 44(2) 290 300.  
2 s 18 and s 54 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. The Insolvency Act refers to ‘trustees’, defined to include provisional 
trustees; whilst the Companies Act 61 of 1973 refers to ‘liquidators’, again, defined to include provisional liquidators); 
Also see Calitz  Reformatory Approach to State Regulation of Insolvency Law in South Africa (2009 Doctoral thesis 
UP) 12, it is stated that Insolvency Practitioner is the generic term used to denote the appointment of both trustees and 
liquidators. Trustees are appointed to sequestrated estates and trusts, while liquidators are appointed to liquidated 
companies and close corporations. Also see the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Legislative 
Guide which provides that the insolvency laws refer to the person responsible for administering the insolvency 
proceedings by a number of different titles, including “administrators”, “trustees”, “liquidators”, “supervisors”, 
“receivers”, “curators”, “official” or “judicial managers” or “commissioners”. 
3 s 56 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1916. 
4 s 18 and s 57 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
5 s 368 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The provisions of the Insolvency Act also apply considerably, mutatis 
mutandis, to the winding up of insolvent companies and to the appointment of liquidators and provisional liquidators, 
as these are imported into the Companies Act 61 of 1973 by virtue of s 339. Although the later was repealed, Item 9 
of Schedule 5 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 prescribes that Chapter 14 of the later continues to apply until the date 
determined by the Minister. 
6 Calitz and Burdette “The appointment of insolvency practitioners in South Africa: time for change?” TSAR 2006 
721 728. 
7 s 55 of the Insolvency Act 32 of 1936. 
8 n 5 above. 
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made in all cases.9 Since the legislation does not provide a standard for appointments, the Master 
has often exercised an unfettered discretion when making the appointments.10 In the exercise of 
such a discretion, the Master has, for decades adopted procedures which were mainly characterized 
by informal processes, such as the ‘Master’s panel and the ‘Requisition system’,11 to coordinate 
appointments of insolvency practitioners. Even so, the Master’s panel and the Requisition system 
were widely criticized for, amongst other things, lack of a legal status.12   
The criticism against the Master’s appointment systems motivated a need to develop a regulatory 
mechanism for the appointment of insolvency practitioners. During the 1990s to 2001, the 
government introduced new strategies in the form of policy documents for the appointment of 
trustees and liquidators with the objective to transform the insolvency profession.13 For instance, 
the 1990s Policy was called for pursuant to concerns that the insolvency profession was, for a long 
time, dominated by white male practitioners.14 The focus of the Policy was that the appointments 
be inclusive of previously disadvantaged individuals or groups (PDIs), and accordingly, the Master 
created another register for PDIs.15 Despite this attempt, the Ministerial strategies were vilified in 
that they were prone to abuse, such as fronting practices; that they were not approved by 
Parliament; and that they limited the discretion of the Master.16  
The criticisms levelled against the Master’s office called for further attempts to develop the 
insolvency legislation.17 This call led to the amendment of the Insolvency Act whereby a provision 
was made for a procedure in terms of which the insolvency practitioners may be appointed.18 The 
amended provisions confer powers to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
(Minister) to establish a Policy for the appointment of insolvency practitioners,19 and that the 
                                                          
9 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 731. 
10 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 731. 
11 Informal methods, meaning that those systems were not flowing from the legislation or from a policy approved by 
Parliament, thus had no legal status. The Master introduced the “Master’s panel of trustees and liquidators” whereby 
the names of persons who qualified to be appointed as insolvency practitioners were kept in a register. A trustee or a 
liquidator could only be appointed if his or her name appeared on the Master’s register. The “Requisition system” was 
the system whereby the creditors submitted the names of nominated trustees and liquidators to the Master for 
consideration, and this system succeeded the Master’s panel. 
12 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 735. 
13 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 735. 
14 Burdette and Calitz “4:3:2:1 Fair distribution of Appointments or Countdown to Catastrophe? South Africa’s 
Ministerial Policy for the Appointment of Liquidators under the Spotlight” 2015 NIBLeJ 437 448. 
15 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 448. 
16 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 448 and 449. 
17 Calitz (n 1) 302. The Minister introduced the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 16 of 2003 to amend the provisions 
of the Insolvency Act. 
18 s 368 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973; s 18 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; and the Judicial Matters Amendment 
Act 16 of 2003. 
19 s 158(2) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
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Master to make the appointments in accordance with the adopted policy.20 Accordingly, the 
Minister published a Policy for the appointment of insolvency practitioners (the Policy) in 2014.21 
After the Policy was published, and before it came into effect, it was challenged in the case lodged 
by the South Africa Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association and Others against 
the Minister, the Master and Others22 (SARIPA case) on constitutional grounds, including that it 
fettered the Master’s discretion to make appointments, amongst others. After a long battle from 
the High Court of South Africa (High Court) to the Constitutional Court (ConCourt), the Policy 
was declared unconstitutional and invalid. It is submitted  therefore, that there is no policy in South 
Africa determined in terms of any legislation to guide the process of appointments of insolvency 
practitioners,23 and the problems and pitfalls in the current appointment system remain unresolved. 
1.1  Research Statement 
 
In the absence of a policy to guide the appointment process, and in view of many challenges in the 
insolvency industry including the challenges highlighted above, it is submitted that the position 
regarding the appointments of insolvency practitioners continues to be indeterminate. On that note, 
it is further submitted that there is an urgent need for the Minister to determine a valid policy. 
Against this background, this study seeks to examine the problems and pitfalls associated with the 
appointments of insolvency practitioners in South Africa. The latest judgments in the SARIPA case 
are relevant, and will be analysed with a view to identify the pitfalls that led to the constitutional 
invalidity of the Policy, as well as the existing challenges in the current appointment system of 
insolvency practitioners. It is also the aim of this study to propose the potential corrective measures 
that may be considered by policy makers in the revision of the Policy. The conclusions reached in 
the SARIPA case were a testimony that the Policy failed to transform the insolvency industry and 
to address its growing needs. Accordingly, in line with the views expressed in the SARIPA case, 
this study will argue that the emerging regulatory system which aims to transform the insolvency 
profession is not capable to effectively address the challenges faced in the appointments of 
insolvency practitioners; and that more needs to be done to close the gaps in the appointment 
processes. It will also be argued that, as it stands, South Africa is in disarray insofar as the 
regulatory system for the appointments of insolvency practitioners is concerned. It would be fair 
                                                          
20 n 4 above. 
21 Policy on the Appointment of Insolvency Practitioners (published in GG 38088 of 7 February 2014). 
22 South African Restructuring And Insolvency Practitioners Association v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Another 2015 2 SA 430 (WCC); Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v South African 
Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association 2017 1 All SA 331 (SCA); Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development v South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association 2018 20 (CC). 
23 There is no policy established in terms of s 158(2) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 read with s 339 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 and s 1A(a) of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
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to also point out that the envisaged Ministerial Policy was out of step with the international 
regulatory standards.  
 
1.2  Chapter overview 
 
In order to deal effectively with the topic at hand, the study will be distributed into six parts.   
 
(a) Firstly, Part one is the introduction and presents the main issues that will be addressed in 
the study;  
(b) Part two, looks at the current appointment practice of insolvency practitioners in South 
Africa; 
(c) Part three, looks at the SARIPA case, and analyzes the judgments of the High Court, 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), and the ConCourt;  
(d) Part four, examines the international instruments such as the World Bank report and the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Legislative Guide; 
(e) Part 5, sets out the problems and pitfalls in the previous and current appointment practices; 
and 
(f) Lastly, Part six, will be the concluding remarks and recommendations for consideration by 
policy makers.  
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2 The current appointment practice of Insolvency Practitioners in South Africa  
 
2.1   Introduction 
The South African insolvency law is regulated by the state through various legislation.24 However, 
there are certain aspects of insolvency proceedings that are regulated by the state but not in terms 
of the legislation. The appointment of insolvency practitioners is one of those aspects whereby the 
state through legislation regulates the appointment of insolvency practitioners, but the applicable 
legislation does not prescribe a procedure for appointments. The Insolvency Act, the Companies 
Act, and the Close Corporations Act,25 respectively regulate the sequestration or liquidation of 
estates and the appointment of insolvency practitioners to administer the estates of individuals, 
companies and close corporations. Although the Companies Act was repealed, the advent of the 
2008 Companies Act (the 2008 Act)26 added another legislation governing the winding up and 
liquidation of companies, and certain provisions of the Companies Act  continue to apply.27 
Burdette and Calitz mention three types of appointments that are provided for in terms of the 
statute,28 and appointments in terms of the non-statutory mechanisms.29 Calitz and Burdette 
suggests that there is a discrepancy between what is provided in terms of the legislation and what 
happens in practice.30 In practice, the aspects of appointing practitioners was administered in terms 
of the non-statutory criteria called the Master’s panel, and subsequently, the Requisition system 
succeeded the Master’s panel. There are also Ministerial Policies that were developed with an 
attempt to transform the appointments system to make it inclusive of PDIs.  
 
At the heart of the insolvency regulation is the Master, a public official entrusted with the power 
to administer the sequestration and liquidation of estates in terms of the applicable legislation. 
Although the Master administers the sequestration and liquidation of estate in terms of various 
legislations, he is appointed in terms of one legislation, the Administration of Estates Act,31 and is 
also regarded as the regulator and or a supervisory body in the insolvency law.32 One of the 
                                                          
24 Habi A comparative study of some issues relating to corporate insolvency law in Nigeria and South Africa (2013 
thesis UP) 11; See also Cassim Regulation of insolvency law in South Africa: The need for reform (2014 thesis UKZN) 
9. 
25 The Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
26 The Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
27 n 5 above. 
28 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 441. 
29 Those appointment mechanisms had no legal status, and were not presented in Parliament for approval.  
30 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 729. 
31 s 2 of Act 66 of 1965. 
32 Cassim (n 24) 9 and 10. 
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controversial functions of the Master is to appoint insolvency practitioners.33 In terms of the 
current practice, the Master exercises an administrative discretion to appoint the provisional 
trustees and provisional liquidators of insolvent estates once a provisional order is issued.34 The 
creditors still have a role to play in the insolvency proceedings, namely, to elect a trustee of their 
choice whom the Master may appoint as final trustee and liquidator of the estate.35 However, the 
Master’s discretion extends far beyond in that he is not bound by the creditor’s choice.36 
 
The question as to why it is important for the Master to maintain the discretionary powers when 
making appointments was answered in Ex Parte: Master of the High Court South Africa (North 
Gauteng) (Ex Parte Master),37 where the court held that the Master has exclusive powers to 
appoint provisional trustees, liquidators and judicial managers taking into account the directives 
of creditors. The court reasoned that the office of the Master has knowledge and expertise to apply 
policy, and to assess the integrity of insolvency practitioners in order to judge whether the 
individuals qualify to be appointed.38 Regardless of that affirmation, the Master has been criticised 
for failing to apply his discretion properly when making appointments.39 Although the Master’s 
powers to adopt the current appointment practices stems from the legislation, however, it is 
submitted that the absence of a clear guide on how such appointment must be made continues to 
present irregularities in the appointment process. This part of the study discusses the previous and 
current appointment mechanisms that were, and are still utilised in the Master’s office.  
2.2 Appointments in terms of the Statutory criteria 
 
2.2.1 Appointments by the Master in terms of the Insolvency Act  
 
The Insolvency Act regulates the debtor’s estate when sequestrated for the benefit of creditors. 
Section 18 (1), section 18 (4), and section 57 (5) respectively, provide for the appointment of three 
                                                          
33 Apart from the function of appointing insolvency practitioners, the Master, inter alia, performs the following 
functions: supervising the administration of estates of deceased persons, including the registration of wills; registration 
of trusts; supervising the administration of estates of minors and legally incapacitated persons and the administration 
of the “Guardian’s Fund”, where unclaimed monies and certain funds of minors and incapacitated persons are held in 
reserve. The Master performs these functions in terms of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, the Wills Act 
7 of 1953, the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002, and the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. 
34 n 4 above. 
35 s 54 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 provides that, at the first meeting of creditors, all creditors who have proved 
claims are permitted to elect one or two trustees.  
36 Ex parte the Master of the High Court South Africa 2011 5 311 (GNP) par 33. 
37 Ex parte Master (n 36) par 12 and 26. 
38 Ex parte Master (n 36) par 33. 
39 Cassim (n 24) 20. 
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types of insolvency practitioners in a sequestrated estate, namely the provisional trustees, final 
trustees, and co-trustees.  
 
Section 18 (1) of the Insolvency Act provides for the appointment of provisional trustees, and 
states that: 
 
“(1) As soon as an estate has been sequestrated (whether provisionally or finally) or when a 
person appointed as trustee ceases to be trustee or to function as such, the Master may, in 
accordance with a policy determined by the Minister, appoint a provisional trustee to the estate 
in question who shall give security to the satisfaction of the Master for the proper performance of 
his duties as provisional trustee and shall hold office until the appointment of a trustee.” (emphasis 
added) 
 
Section 18(4) provides for the appointment of a final trustee if there was no trustee elected in the 
meeting of creditors: 
 
“(4) When a meeting of creditors for the election of a trustee has been held in terms of section 
forty and no trustee has been elected, and the Master has appointed a provisional trustee in the 
estate in question, the Master shall appoint him as trustee on his finding such additional security 
as the Master may have required.” 
 
Section 57 further provides for the appointment of a co-trustee, and states:  
 
“(5) Whenever the Master considers desirable, he or she may, in accordance with a policy 
determined the Minister, appoint a person not disqualified from holding an office of trustees who 
has given security in section 56, as trustee or trustees of an insolvent estate.” (emphasis added) 
 
2.2.1.1 Commentary on section 18 and section 57 of the Insolvency Act  
 
It is important to note that the above provisions empower the Master to make provisional 
appointments, final appointment and co-appointments of trustees. These provisions further 
prescribe how such appointments may be made, that the Master may appoint in accordance with 
a policy determined by the Minister. Therefore, it is submitted that before a Master may appoint 
provisional trustees, there must be an approved policy which prescribes the manner or criteria by 
which appointments may be made. At present, there is no policy determined in terms of the above 
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provisions. Consequently, in the absence of the appointments criteria, the Master exercises an 
unfettered discretion to make provisional appointments and co-appointments. The appointments 
of a final trustee by the Master is triggered by the fact that there was no nomination of a trustee at 
the meeting of creditors. What is also noted with the provision for appointments of co-trustees is 
that it is triggered when the Master considers it ‘desirable’ to make such an appointment. It is 
submitted therefore, that the Master’s discretion in this instance in not a questionable one, as the 
decision lies with the Master on whether or not the circumstances desire such an appointment.  
 
2.2.2       Appointments by the Master in terms of the Companies Act  
 
The provisions for appointments of provisional liquidators in terms of the Companies Act are 
similar to section 18 of the Insolvency Act. The appointment of a provisional liquidator is provided 
for in section 368 of the Companies Act. That section provides that:  
 
“As soon as a winding-up order has been made in relation to a company, or a special resolution 
for a voluntary winding-up of a company has been registered in terms of section 200, the Master 
may, in accordance with a policy determined by the Minister, appoint any suitable person as 
provisional liquidator of the company concerned, who shall give security to the satisfaction of the 
Master for the proper performance of his or her duties as provisional liquidator and who shall 
hold office until the appointment of a liquidator”. (emphasis added) 
 
2.2.2.1 Commentary on section 368 of the Companies Act 
 
In as much as section 368 is worded similar to section 18, the striking feature with the former is 
that the Master has a discretion to identify a ‘suitable person’. Although the Companies Act does 
not describe or define the qualities of a suitable person, it is submitted that this provision serves as 
a safeguard in the appointment process to prevent inappropriate appointments. A further safeguard 
is provided by the fact that the practitioner appointed, must furnish the Master with security for 
the proper performance of his or her duties.40 It is also submitted that, in making appointments in 
terms of section 368, the Master is free to consider various factors, such as the relevant skills, 
experience, the value of the estate, available infrastructure, amongst others, in order to decide on 
the suitability of the appointee.  
 
 
                                                          
40 n 4 above. 
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2.3 The appointments in terms of the Non-Statutory criteria  
 
2.3.1  The Master’s panel 
In the absence of the statutory criteria on how the appointments may be made, the Master, in his 
own accord, developed certain procedures to guide the appointment process.41 Firstly, a panel of 
suitable candidates to be appointed as trustees and liquidators was established. The Master’s panel 
comprised of a list of persons who had shown to have the necessary skills, qualifications, 
experience, expertise and integrity to be on the panel.42 The Master appointed a person who 
appeared on the list upon such person submitting an application for his or her name to be added 
on the list. The list was updated to a National list after a directive was issued to other Master’s 
centres with the aim to integrate all the Master’s lists and to ensure consistency in the appointment 
process.43 In order for a practitioner to be added on the list, the candidate was required to submit 
to the Master certain documentation in terms of a checklist which dealt with the applicant’s 
experience, infrastructure, ability to provide security, and the applicant’s qualifications. This was 
followed by an interview to determine if a candidate is fit and proper.44 Despite this effort, it 
remained a concern that the Master’s panel was not determined in terms of the legislation.45 
2.3.2 The Requisition system 
 
The Requisition system came about as a result of the necessity that the Master must immediately 
take control of the estate once an order is issued.46 Challenges were encountered in the Master’s 
office whereby the Master was burdened by the estate while waiting for the process of appointing 
a provisional trustee. In the interest of protecting creditors and to ensure continuity in the persons 
that were appointed as provisional and final trustee, the Master issued a directive that nominations 
were to be requested from creditors prior to making a provisional appointment.47 This resulted to 
an introduction of a Requisition system which allows creditors to submit nominations as to who 
the Master should appoint as provisional trustee or liquidator of an estate. The creditors are 
required to file requisition forms with the Master’s office within 48 hours of the winding up or 
                                                          
41 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 732. 
42 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 732. 
43 Chief Master’s Directive 1 of 2015 dated 30 March 2015. 
44 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 732. 
45 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 733. 
46 Section 20(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act and section 361(1) of the Companies Act provide that the estate must vest 
on the Master until the first creditor’s meeting is convened. 
47 The directive was a letter sent to all insolvency practitioners. The directive informed the practitioners that the Master 
will in future ask for nominations from creditors before making provisional appointments. 
10 
 
sequestration order.48 The Requisitions indicated the value of the claim against the estate or 
property and the creditor’s choice of provisional trustee or liquidator chosen from a list of 
insolvency practitioners. The Requisition system had not always resulted in the creditors’ choice 
being appointed, apart from the Master utilising it as a guide to his otherwise ‘unfettered’ 
discretion.49 The Requisition system has its own flaws, but it is commended for its mentorship 
programme that was introduced by the Ministerial Strategies (discussed below). Regardless of 
those strategies, the Master was often accused of acting mechanically when making appointments 
in terms of the nominations made by creditors.50 
 
2.3.3 Appointments in terms of the Ministerial Policies and Strategies 
 
During the late 1990s, it was seen that there was little or no transformation in the insolvency 
profession since the inception of democracy in South Africa.51 In line with these considerations, 
the Minister developed a policy with the aim of mitigating the challenges concerning slow 
transformation in the insolvency sector. Again, in 2001, as a second attempt to introduce the 
employment equity-type measures into the appointments’ process, the Minister further developed 
a Policy document which sought to ensure that the PDIs were included and advanced in the 
insolvency industry by being appointed as co-trustees and co-liquidators.52 Most notably with 
these developments, the Ministerial Policies were not within the meaning of the post 2004 
legislative amendment of the Insolvency Act; and were not approved by Parliament.53 It is worthy 
to note that the Master continues to use the 2001 Policy for the appointment of PDIs in all estates.  
 
The Master’s function as the insolvency regulator and the inadequacies in the South African 
regulatory system, particularly with regards to the appointment of insolvency practitioners, and 
regulation of their conduct and practice has since remained contentious.54 The problems with 
corruption in the Master’s office led to the amendment of the insolvency legislation in 2004 which 
made a provision that the appointment of insolvency practitioners be made in accordance with a 
policy determined by the Minister.55 In 2014, the Minister published a Policy for the appointment 
                                                          
48 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 446. 
49 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 733. 
50 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 447  
51 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 448. 
52 Strategy on Procedures for Appointment of Liquidators and Trustees (dated June 2001).   
53 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 736. 
54 Habi (n 24) 26. 
55 Van der Linde “Transformation in the South African insolvency industry: still stuck on policy” (draft paper, 
unpublished); n 4 above. 
11 
 
of insolvency practitioners which was challenged in Courts before coming into effect.56 The Courts 
ruled that the Policy was invalid and sent the Minister back to the drawing board for its revision. 
At this juncture, it is sufficient to submit that, a step to determine the 2014 Policy was a significant 
development in the South African insolvency laws despite the many pitfalls that were identified in 
the Policy. A detailed discussion on the failed Ministerial Policy, including the criticisms against 
it follows in Part 3 of this study. 
 
2.4   Conclusion  
 
It is reasonable to submit that South African insolvency system is in disarray as far as the 
appointments of insolvency practitioners are concerned. The different appointment mechanisms 
highlighted above emphasise the point that there are problems surrounding the process for 
appointments of insolvency practitioners. The current regulatory system has loopholes and 
uncertainties as it fails to provide clear, transparent guidelines for the appointment processes. 
Further, the current system is non-legislatively mandated; and leaves the Master with an unguided 
discretion to coordinate the appointments of insolvency practitioners. The South African 
insolvency laws provide that there must be a criteria to guide the Master’s discretion when making 
appointments. However, in more than a decade since the legislative was amended, such a criteria 
is still indeterminate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 n 19 and n 22 above. 
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3 Analysis of the South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Associations 
judgments (SARIPA case) 
 
3.1  Introduction  
 
In the SARIPA case, the courts were confronted with complex issues arising from the Policy which 
sought to transform the insolvency profession, and to address the challenges that exist in the 
regulatory system for the appointments of insolvency practitioners.57 Although the goals and 
objectives of the Policy were admirable, however, the Policy could not pass constitutional muster 
on good intentions alone.58 The issues raised in the SARIPA case suggested that the Policy would 
not cure the mischief it aimed to address. The Courts took issue with what it found to be a 
mechanical application of the Policy, which failed to appreciate and provide any scope to allow 
the Master to consider the skills, knowledge, expertise and experience of the practitioner when 
appointing trustees, and that the Policy failed to meet the remedial measure contemplated in section 
9 of the Constitution.59 Although there were differing views on the aspects of the discretion 
conferred upon the Master by the Policy, nonetheless, the Courts shared the same views in that the 
Policy was not capable of transforming the insolvency industry and to achieve equality, which 
meant that there was no rational link between the Policy and its purpose.  
 
3.2 The relevant facts in the SARIPA case 
 
The SARIPA case had commenced in 2014 when SARIPA, joined by other interested Insolvency 
organisations (Applicants),60 lodged an application in the High Court, Western Cape to challenge 
the constitutional validity of the Policy.61  The application was divided into Part A and Part B. Part 
A was for an interim order restraining the implementation of the Policy, and Part B was to have 
the Policy reviewed and set aside. In respect of Part A, the court interdicted the Minister and the 
Master from implementing the Policy pending the review application that was set out in Part B. 
The review application travelled a long way to the apex court, which eventually, also slammed the 
Policy as unconstitutional and invalid. 
 
  
                                                          
57 n 21 above. 
58 n 21 above. 
59 n 22 above. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.  
60 The Concerned Insolvency Practitioners Associations (CIPA), the National Association of Managing Agents 
(NAMA), Solidarity and the Vereniging van Regslui vir Afrikaans. 
61 n 21 and n 22 above. 
13 
 
3.2.1 The failed Ministerial Policy 
 
Following the amendment of the Insolvency Act as a result of the coming into effect of the Judicial 
Matters Amendment Act,62 the Minister determined and published a policy which provided for a 
procedure for the appointment of insolvency practitioners.63 The Policy was the first of its kind to 
be promulgated in terms of the Insolvency Act, and to replace all previous policies.64 Its objective 
was to promote fairness, transparency and the achievement of equality for persons previously 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in line with the Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment requirements.65 The aim of the Policy was to transform the insolvency profession 
to ensure that it is accessible or is inclusive of PDIs. The Policy came following the glitches in the 
current reforms in that they were characterised inter alia, by corruption and skewed briefing 
patterns, and favouritism.66 As a result, the Policy purported to prevent corruption and other 
irregularities in the appointment process.67 In accordance with the Policy, the Master was required 
to issue a directive to all Master’s offices to implement and monitor the application of the Policy.68 
The Policy further empowered the Master to make provisional appointments of trustees, 
liquidators and curator bonis on a rotational basis.69  
 
Most notably, Clause 6 of the Policy made a provision for different categories of insolvency 
practitioners, divided into, among other things, race, gender and seniority; and required that each 
category to be arranged in an alphabetical order according to the practitioner’s surname or first 
name in a case of similar surnames. The Policy further distinguished between senior and junior 
practitioners. Four categories were created, namely Category A, B, C, and D, where:  
 
 Category A: African, Coloured, Indian, and Chinese females who became citizens before 
27 April 1994;  
 Category B: African, Coloured, Indian, and Chinese males who became citizens before 27 
April 1994;  
 Category C: White females  who became citizens before 27 April 1994; and 
                                                          
62 n 17 above. Act 16 of 2003 introduced the office of the Chief Master as an executive officer of all Master’s offices; 
inserted section 158(2) of the Insolvency Act, section 10A of the Close Corporations Act; and section 14(1A) (a) of 
the Companies Act 1973. 
63 n 19 above. 
64 Clause 2 of the Policy. 
65 Clause 3.1 of the Policy. 
66 Kohn and Cachalia “Restitutionary measures properly understood and the extension of the quota ban-locating 
SARIPA in the s 9 (2) Van Heerden framework” 2017 Acta Juridica 146 152. 
67 Clause 4 (e) of the Policy. 
68 Clause 5 of the Policy. 
69 Clause 1.3 of the Policy. 
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 Category D: African, Coloured, Indian, and Chinese females who became citizens before 
27 April 1994. 
 
Furthermore, Clause 7 of the Policy also set out a specified ratio of A4: B3: C2 and D1 (4:3:2:1), 
which the Masters of the High Courts were to adopt when appointing insolvency practitioners. 
According to the ratio, the Master was required to appoint four practitioners from Category A, 
three practitioners from Category B, two practitioners from Category C, and one practitioner from 
Category D. The Master had no power to depart from this save for circumstances where the Master 
decides that an estate was a complex estate.  In this regard, the Policy provided that: 
 
 “after having regard to the complexity of the matter, and the suitability of the next in line 
insolvency practitioner, and subject to applicable law, the Master may appoint a senior 
practitioner jointly with the junior or senior practitioner appointed in an alphabetical order”70  
 
Even within such a limited scope, the Master was required to still motivate the deviation from the 
strict procedure, and explain such appointments to the practitioner who would otherwise have been 
appointed but for the exercise of the Master’s discretion. Further, where the insolvency 
practitioners allocated do not lodge a security bond in time, or there is or arises a conflict of 
interest, the Master was required to appoint the next insolvency practitioner on the list. 71 
 
3.2.2 Constitutional challenge 
 
SARIPA and Others challenged the Policy on four grounds, namely, that it infringed the right to 
equality provided for in section 9 of the Constitution; it unlawfully fettered the discretion of the 
Master; it was ultra vires the Insolvency Act; and that it was irrational.72 The main dispute was 
centred on Clauses 6, Clause 7 of the Policy, and on whether the Policy applied only to provisional 
appointments.73 It was common cause that the Policy purported to be a remedial measure aimed at 
transforming the insolvency industry, that it targeted certain categories of persons, and that a 
system that embraced a raced-based quotas is not permitted on any remedial measure.74 
 
 
                                                          
70 Clause 7.3 of the Policy. 
71 Clause 7.3 and 7.4 of the Policy. 
72 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 65. 
73 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 70. 
74 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 71. 
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3.3 The High Court, SCA and ConCourt judgments 
 
3.3.1   The High Court judgment 
 
The High Court held that the Policy fettered the Master’s discretion, save for clause 7.3 of the 
Policy, which, according to the court’s view ‘saved’ the Policy from unfettering the Master’s 
discretion.75 The Court accepted that the Master’s discretion is limited by legislation, and the court 
does not have the power to interfere with such imposition.76 In addressing the issue of rationality, 
the court held that rationality is required in the exercise of all public power, including measures 
adopted under section 9(2) of the Constitution.77 The Court thus addressed the rationality issue 
together with the enquiry on equality. In doing so, the Court examined the Van Heerden case78 
which sets out a three stage test on rationality. Since it was not disputed that the Policy was aimed 
at targeting a certain category of people who were subject to unfair discrimination, the court thus 
focused on the second leg of the Van Heerden test, which addressed the issue of whether the Policy 
was designed to protect and advance certain categories of people.79 The Court had regard of the 
current appointment system to consider the arguments that such a system accommodated the PDIs 
on every matter, whereas the Policy did not guarantee the appointment of such persons.80 The 
Court agreed to SARIPA’s contentions that the Policy did not only apply to provisional 
appointments, and included co-appointments.81 Consequently, the court held that if the Policy aims 
to transform the insolvency industry, it needs to do more than increase the numbers.82 This would 
constitute formal equality which is not the aim of a remedial measure. It further held that the Policy 
was inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid for the reason that it did not relate to the purpose 
for which the power was given and to the information available to the functionary exercising the 
power. The Policy changed a feature of the industry’s regulatory framework that required a proper 
match between a liquidator and a trustee with a particular estate.83 The Court also affirmed that it 
                                                          
75 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 112. 
76 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 120. 
77 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 129. 
78 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 ZACC 3. At par 37, the Court stated that, when a measure is challenged 
as violating the equality provision, its defender may meet the claim by showing that the measure is contemplated by 
section 9(2) in that it promotes the achievement of equality and is designed to protect and advance persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. The Court further held that, to determine whether a measure falls within 
section 9(2), the enquiry is threefold. The first yardstick relates to whether the measure targets persons or categories 
of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; the second is whether the measure is designed to 
protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; and the third requirement is whether the measure promotes 
the achievement of equality. 
79 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 140. 
80 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 144. 
81 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 148. 
82 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 156. 
83 n 79 above. 
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is the Master who appoints insolvency practitioners and must apply a discretion when making 
appointments.84 Lastly, the Court concluded that Policy created a rigid and inflexible regime in 
which the Master effectively became a rubber stamp and was compelled to appoint a designated 
person by rote from a fixed lists arranged alphabetically and on race and gender lines.85 
 
3.3.2    The SCA judgment 
 
At appeal, the SCA reviewed Clause 6 and 7 of the Policy and upheld the court aquo’s finding in 
that the Policy was unconstitutional and invalid. On the equality submissions, the court held that 
Clause 7.1 of the Policy embodied the strict allocation of appointments in accordance with race 
and gender, which was arbitrary, capricious and displayed naked preference which is prohibited 
by section 9(3) of the Constitution.86 The Court disagreed with the court aquo’s views that Clause 
7.3 saved the Policy, and held that the Policy’s arbitrariness was not saved by Clause 7.3 as it does 
not resolve the fact that clause 7.1 requires the Master to make appointments in accordance with a 
rigid quota.87 The SCA concluded that the Master’s discretion was not improperly unfettered.88 
The SCA reasoned that the Master’s functions are bound by legislation, and in that instance, the 
Master’s powers were bound by the Policy determined by the Minister.89 The SCA accepted, 
however, that section 18 of the Insolvency Act is not meant to remove entirely the discretion of 
the Master, but to provide a yardstick within which the Master may exercise his powers.90 The 
SCA further recognised that, while Clause 7.1 imposes a considerable restriction, Clause 7.3 
retains a certain level of a discretion.91 On the issue of rationality of the Policy, the SCA held that 
the Policy failed to meet the test formulated in Van Heerden test, and lamented the fact that there 
was no explanation by the Master for the basis upon which the Policy was formulated.92 There was 
no proper explanation regarding how the ratio in the Policy was determined, and no proper figures 
to show the number of practitioners in each category. Thus, the SCA held that in the absence of 
information regarding the basis upon which the Policy was formulated, and proper information 
concerning the current demographics of insolvency practitioners, it was not possible to say that 
the Policy was formulated on a rational basis which was properly directed at the legitimate goal of 
                                                          
84 SARIPA WCC (n 22) par 231. 
85 n 80 above. 
86 SARIPA SCA (n 22) par 32, 33, and 36. 
87 SARIPA SCA (n 22) par 34. 
88 SARIPA SCA (n 22) par 45. 
89 SARIPA SCA (n 22) par 44 
90 n 88 above. 
91 n 88 above. 
92 SARIPA SCA (n 22) par 46. 
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removing the effects of past discrimination and furthering the advancement of persons from 
previously disadvantaged groups.93  
 
In a concurring judgment, the SCA held that given the purpose of the insolvency legislation, the 
actions of the Minister in determining the Policy under the Insolvency Act, and the actions that the 
Master must undertake in terms of that Policy must be in accordance with the interests of creditors 
of the estate.94 The SCA further held that, since the Policy failed to have regard of the insolvency 
legislation, that it was formulated on the basis that those interests were irrelevant, and that the 
Policy did not recognise or serve those interests, the Policy was outside the legitimate powers 
vested in the Minister. Further that the promulgation thereof involved a breach of the principle of 
legality.95 The SCA dismissed the appeal with costs.96  
 
3.3.3  The ConCourt judgment 
In the majority judgment, the Court concurred with the High Court’s finding on the issue that the 
Policy unlawfully fettered the Master’s discretion and held that the Policy required the Master to 
appoint the next in line practitioners in each case.97 The Policy did not allow the Master to consider 
other relevant factors such as the skills and experience of the practitioners to be appointed. The 
majority disagreed that Clause 7.3 saved the Policy from unfettering the Master’s discretion as it 
did not apply to the bulk of appointments that were subject to Clause 7.1.98 The Court adopted a 
reasoning that the policy document serves to guide the decision maker, and as such should not be 
applied rigidly. The Court disagreed with the concurring judgment of the SCA on the issue of 
legality of the Policy. The Court held that the scheme of appointment adopted by the Minister was 
in line with the Insolvency Act,99 and based its reasoning on the fact that the objectives of the 
Policy were to advance the interest of creditors. The Court pointed on the fact that the Policy 
required the appointment in terms of the list which contained qualified insolvency practitioners, 
and there was a need for the Master to invoke Clause 7.3 where the estate is a complex one; that 
alone was one of the ways in which the interests of creditors were taken into account.100 The Court 
                                                          
93 SARIPA SCA (n 22) par 47. 
94 SARIPA SCA (n 22) par 63. 
95 SARIPA SCA (n 2 and n 94) above and par 64. 
96 SARIPA SCA (n 22) par 52. 
97 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 117. 
98 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 32. 
99 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 36. 
100 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 35. 
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further held that when the Master appoints an insolvency practitioner, the aim is to protect the 
interest of creditors as the Master steps into the shoes of creditors.101  
 
On the issue of equality, the Court held that the Policy was unlikely to achieve equality and was 
incapable to attain the desired future outcome.102 The Court reasoned that there was no information 
presented to it on how the Policy was to be implemented by different Master’s offices.103 The 
Court further noted the defect in category D of the Policy, holding that appointing one practitioner 
from category D entrenches the status quo as white males dominated that category.104 Furthermore, 
the Court pointed out that category D discriminates against other races on the ground that they 
became citizens on or after 27 April 1994.105 The Court concluded that the Policy was arbitrary 
and capricious in that the Minister could not provide reasons why the previously disadvantaged 
people should be treated differently based on the date on which they became citizens. 106  
 
In addressing the issue of rationality, the Court held that the reasons supporting the finding that 
the Policy was not capable of achieving equality were equally applicable to the rationality enquiry. 
The Court reasoned that the Minister failed to prove that the Policy was reasonably capable to 
achieve equality which meant that there was no proof of a rational connection between the Policy 
and the purpose sought to be achieved. As a result, the majority concluded that the appeal be 
dismissed with costs. 107 
 
The minority held that the appointment process should not be categorised into different 
components, and that the important consideration should be on what the Policy seeks to achieve, 
and whether the process adopted is in agreement with that.108 The minority pointed out that there 
was no need to distinguish between Clause 7.1 and 7.3 because if all the practitioners in the 
Master’s list are suitable qualified; there was no need for the Master to exercise a discretion.109 
The minority concluded that the Policy is consistent with section 18 of the Insolvency Act. The 
minority also disagreed with the majority on the notion that there was no information to show that 
the Policy was capable of achieving equality. It held that the information that was presented 
                                                          
101 SARIPA CC n 22 and n 99 above. 
102 SARIPA CC (n22) par 40, 44 and 48. 
103 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 40. 
104 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 41. 
105 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 42. 
106 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 54. 
107 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 60. 
108 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 76. 
109 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 77. 
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showed that the Policy would achieve equality envisaged in section 9 of the Constitution.110 It held 
further that it was not a requirement of Van Heerden test that a remedial measure must be able to 
predict its future outcomes with precision.111 On the issue of rationality, the minority held that 
there is no irrationality in the Policy’s distribution of work according to South Africa’s 
demographics in order to promote equality.112 Because of the continued dominance of white 
practitioners, in particular, white men in the insolvency industry, using the current demographic 
make-up of the profession would perpetuate the very imbalance that the Policy seeks to remedy.113 
Therefore, the minority held that the Policy bore a rational connection to the achievement of 
equality and that the differentiation of categories of persons affected by the policy is not one that 
was arrived at irrationally.114  
 
Ultimately, the minority judgment agreed with the majority in that the placement of practitioners 
who became citizens on or after 27 April 1994 in category D was arbitrary and constitutionally 
invalid. However, it found that this invalidity does not affect the Policy as a whole.115 In the result, 
the minority would have granted leave and upheld the appeal except insofar as the Policy placed 
the practitioners who became citizens on or after 27 April 1994 in category D. The minority would 
have invalidated the Policy to the extent of that placement. The minority also agreed to the 
majority’s view that the Policy breaches the principle of legality for failing to cater the interests of 
creditors cannot be upheld. Its reasoning on this was based on the notion that every practitioner 
who is added on the Master’s list is supposed to be qualifies. That alone does cater for the interests 
of creditors.116   
 
3.4 Commentary on the SARIPA judgments 
 
The conclusion reached in the SARIPA has invited further concerns to investigate the current state 
of the insolvency regulation, in particular, the appointment process of insolvency practitioners in 
South Africa. The Courts found that the Policy was unconstitutional and invalid based on a number 
of reasons. It is important to note that the Courts differed in opinions on whether or not the Policy 
fettered the Master’s discretion unlawfully. While the High Court took the view that the Policy 
unlawful fettered the Master’s discretion, the SCA held the contrary, and the ConCourt concurred 
                                                          
110 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 89. 
111 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 90. 
112 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 98. 
113 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 99. 
114 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 101. 
115 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 70. 
116 SARIPA CC (n 22) par 65. 
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with the High Court. Most notably, although the ConCourt concurred with the High Court, 
however, it adopted a different reasoning to arrive at its decision. The ConCourt also slammed the 
SCA’s concurring judgment that the Policy failed to consider the interests of creditors, and the 
purpose of the insolvency law. Also notably, the minority in the ConCourt differed with the 
majority, save for the issue with the placement in category D. This study agrees with the Court’s 
views that the Policy unlawfully fettered the discretion of the Master, and submits that constraining 
the Master’s powers with a rigid policy constituted a loophole in the appointment process of 
insolvency practitioners, as the Master would not be in a position to consider other factors relevant 
to a specific appointment in a particular estate. This study further comments on other aspects that 
lead to the policy being declared unconstitutional.  
 
3.4.1  The policy fettered the discretion of the Master 
 
In holding that the Policy fettered the Master’s discretion unlawfully, the High Court took the view 
that the legislature placed the power to appoint insolvency practitioners upon the Master.  Without 
disagreeing with the reasoning of the High Court on this issue, the ConCourt indicated that a 
discretion plays a crucial role in any legal system. The ConCourt relied heavily on the principle 
that a policy merely serves as a guide to a decision maker, and as such, a policy should not be 
applied rigidly; it must still permit the decision maker flexibility to consider other factors other 
than those prescribed.117 
 
It is submitted that the above Courts were correct to hold that, to a large extent, the Policy took 
away the power from the Master to make appointments. To support this view, this study has regard 
to the position of the Master as the insolvency regulator in the South African insolvency law as 
provided for in the legislation and as was affirmed in Ex parte Master. That case is authority on 
the powers of the Master as the only institution authorised to appoint the trustees and liquidators 
in sequestrated estates. The reasoning of the Court in that case confirmed that the Master enjoys a 
wide discretion to make appointments. The powers of the Master were further affirmed in the case 
of Hartley NO v the Master,118 where the court held, with regards to the decision of the Master 
which was subject to a complaint, that the matter was left to the Master to exercise his discretion; 
and that the test was what the Master deemed necessary with regard to prejudice, not what the 
court thought.119 The Court further held that it did not have the power to compel the Master to 
                                                          
117 Par 3.4.3 above. 
118 1921 AD 403. 
119 (n 118) above at par 407. 
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change his mind in respect of a question that the Master had duly considered. Furthermore, in the 
case of Lipschitz v Wattrus NO,120 the court held that the Master clearly has an unfettered and sole 
administrative discretion, and it is within his enacted powers to give directions to his staff about 
such appointments.121  
 
In as much as there are ongoing criticisms regarding the inadequacies in the Master’s office to 
regulate the insolvent estate, it is submitted that the basis for efficacy in the Master’s office is that 
such an institution must be capable to carry its function of making appointments, without the 
interference of other bodies. It is further submitted that it was not the intention that the powers 
conferred by legislation upon the Master be transferred or delegated to other bodies. What the 
Policy does, is indirectly delegating the Master’s discretionary powers to the Minister.  
 
When having regard to the Policy against the Court’s reasoning, it is apparent that the Policy design 
was in such manner that the Master was precluded from considering other factors relevant to an 
estate before making appointments. It is submitted that the Policy purported to ensure that 
appointments were made, and the Master’s duty would be to rubber stamp the appointments 
without due consideration of the consequences of such appointments. In this regard, it is also 
submitted that an appointment mechanism whereby the administrator merely rubber stamps to 
fulfil an administrative duty is not in the best interest of the estate or creditors of that estate. On 
that note, it is submitted that the views in the minority judgment that the Policy catered for the 
interests of creditors is misplaced.   
 
3.5 Commentary on other aspects of the Policy which led to its constitutional invalidity 
 
(a) The Policy infringed the right to equality and was irrational 
 
It goes without saying that the Policy was discriminatory on persons in other categories. Category 
D, comprised of all African, Colored, Indian and Chinese persons who became citizens after 27 
April 1994, grouped together with white male practitioners. This alone was apparent that the Policy 
was going to have a great effect on the persons categorised with white male practitioners as those 
already constitute a large number. Although the Policy met the first leg of Van Heerden test in that 
it was aimed at targeting certain categories of persons, however, other aspects of the Policy could 
not show that it was capable to advance the PDIs. This was obvious in the Policy that it formed a 
barrier for white males, and the youth as the ratio prescribed the selection of one person from 
                                                          
120 1980 (1) SA 662 (T). 
121 (n 121) above at par 671G. 
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Category D. Furthermore, the race and gender categories constituted what is said to be an 
impermissible quota which fall outside the ambit of the second leg of the Van Heerden test and 
section 9 of the Constitution.  
 
On the issue of rationality, the Courts pointed out that the Policy needed to have a correlation with 
the government purpose. The government purpose was to alleviate the problems related to the 
appointment process of insolvency practitioners. The Minister could not present information to 
show the basis on which the Policy was formulated. It is submitted that in the absence of a record 
which informed or assisted the decision maker to arrive at the decision to determine the failed  
Policy, such a decision was irrational. There was no rational connection between establishing the 
Policy and the problems identified in the appointment processes. This is evident by how Category 
D which included all the youth practitioners and white male practitioners. In terms of that category, 
it is impossible to tell if, according to the ratio, a PDI would ever be appointed. Furthermore, one 
of the challenges in the current appointment system is the lack of skills transfer mechanism. The 
Policy failed to address this aspect. It is fair to submit that there was no relationship between the 
issues addressed in the Policy and the actual challenges that it sought to address. On this note, the 
Court was correct in setting the Policy aside as unlawful and unconstitutional for lack of 
rationality.  
 
(b) The Policy was ultra vires the Insolvency Act 
 
The Courts held that the Policy determined by the Minister had to be in accordance with a system 
that gives effect to the intention of the legislature, and that it must address transformation. If it 
does not, it was ultra vires the Insolvency Act. The purpose of the insolvency legislation is to 
secure the realisation of the remaining assets of the insolvent for the benefit of creditors. This is in 
line with the principle of concursus creditorum.122 When the Master appoints the insolvency 
practitioner, he must do so in consideration of the directives of creditors.123 The interests of 
creditors are an important feature in the administration of an insolvent estate; the Policy failed to 
take into account this aspect. It is notable that the appointments of practitioners in terms of the 
current system considers the support of employees before the appointment is made. It is also 
notable that the feature of creditor participation in the insolvency proceedings, and in the 
appointment processes is recognised by the international best practices.124 It is submitted that the 
                                                          
122 See 6.3 below. 
123 See par 2.1 above. 
124 The World Bank urges that the role, rights and governance of creditors in proceedings should be clearly defined. 
The bank further urges that the creditor’s interests should be safeguarded by appropriate means that enable creditors 
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Policy completely ignored the interests or wishes of creditors, and this constituted the exercise of 
power not for the purpose for which it was given the Insolvency Act, Companies Act or the Close 
Corporations Act.  
3.6         Conclusion 
In the overall view of the SARIPA case, it is clear that the Policy lacked a number of elements that 
are suitable to regulate the appointments of insolvency practitioners in South Africa. The main 
pitfall in the Policy was that it failed to address the specific challenges in the appointment system, 
it unlawfully fettered the Master’s discretion, and failed to address the skills transfer in line with 
the purpose of ensuring that the system is inclusive of PDIs. The Policy failed to have regard of 
the international norms and standards which guide the formulation of insolvency laws. It is 
submitted that this was a misstep in the government’s attempt to modernise the insolvency laws 
for appointing insolvency practitioners. Now it stands to be seen how the Policy to be revised by 
the Minister will guide the process of appointments in view of the criticisms in the current system 
as will be seen in the next discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
to effectively monitor and participate in insolvency proceedings to ensure fairness and integrity, including by the 
creation of a creditors’ committee as a preferred mechanism, especially in cases involving numerous creditors. 
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4 The International Regulatory Framework 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The significance of a modern insolvency system as a key foundation of sustainable economic 
development has widely been recognised and documented by the international institutions.125 The 
institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) established systems which make provision for norms and standards for an 
effective insolvency regime that may be adopted by other countries of the world.126 These 
international instruments suggest that the system adopted by a country should ensure that a criteria 
as to who may be an insolvency representative should be objective, clearly established, and 
publicly available.127 Calitz is of the view that the current regulatory system in South Africa fails 
to meet the requirements prescribed by the international instruments.128 Therefore, this chapter 
provides an overview of the international best practices in order to establish how these practices 
fit, or to what extent can they be adopted in the South African context to mitigate the problems in 
the current regulatory system for appointment of insolvency practitioners. This chapter will also 
highlight some of the important considerations that must be made when developing the South 
African insolvency laws. 
 
4.2 World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Systems129 
Following the financial crisis in the Asian markets during the late 1990s, the international 
community called for an intervention.130 As a result, the World Bank stepped in with a project to 
identify certain principles and guidelines for sound insolvency systems and for strengthening of 
related debtor-creditor rights in the emerging markets.131 The World Bank’s initiatives were the 
first internationally recognized benchmarks to evaluate the effectiveness of the domestic 
                                                          
125 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 456. 
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creditor/debtor rights and insolvency systems.132 The World Bank Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes (Principles) were revised several times incorporating 
further developments. What stands out from these revisions was the 2011 revision which 
incorporated the updates made to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 
(Legislative Guide),133 and led to an addition of new principles to reflect the best international 
practice in the regulation of the insolvency of enterprise groups.134 According to the Principles, 
institutions and regulations are crucial to an effective insolvency system.135 The Principles have 
been designed to be sufficiently flexible to apply as a benchmark to all country systems and to 
embody several fundamentally important propositions.136 At the 2011 Insolvency and 
Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force, it was held that one of the lessons learned from the financial 
crisis was the recognition of the problem of consumer insolvency as a systematic risk and the 
consequent need for the modernization of domestic laws and institutions to enable jurisdictions to 
deal effectively and efficiently with the risks of over-indebtedness.137  
It is suggested that the application of the Principles at the country level will be influenced by 
domestic policy choices and by the comparative strengths or weaknesses of applicable laws, 
institutions and regulations, as well as by capacity and resources.138 The Principles provide for the 
key objectives that must be present in the country’s insolvency legislation. It states that an 
insolvency system should aim, inter alia, to integrate with a country’s broader legal and 
commercial systems.139  Without discussing the Principles in general, of more specific relevance 
in this study is the Principles relating to the regulation and or appointment of insolvency 
representatives and the characteristics that must be present on the representative ought to be 
appointed as set out in D7 and D8 of the Principles. These Principles are important as they serve 
as a benchmark in the South African insolvency system with regard to what is required of the 
insolvency practitioners and the supervisory bodies such as the institution of the Master as a way 
to mitigate the problems associated with the appointment of insolvency practitioners.  
                                                          
132 n 130 above. The World Bank and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, in consultation 
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133 n 126 above. 
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Principle D7 provides that the supervisory bodies regulating and supervising the insolvency 
representatives should: 
 Be independent of individual representatives;  
 Set standards that reflect the requirements of the legislation and public expectations of 
fairness, impartiality, transparency, and accountability; and  
 Have appropriate powers and resources to enable them to discharge their functions, duties, 
and responsibilities effectively.140  
In addition, Principle D8 provides for the competence and integrity of the insolvency 
representatives. It states that, the system should ensure that the criteria as to who may be an 
insolvency representative should be objective, clearly established, and publicly available. It also 
provides that the insolvency representatives must be competent to undertake the work to which 
they are appointed and to exercise the powers given to them; must act with integrity, impartiality, 
and independence; and that where insolvency representatives act as managers, they must be held 
to a director and officer standards of accountability, and be subject to removal for incompetence, 
negligence, fraud, or other wrongful conduct.141 
4.3 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (Legislative Guide)142 
The UNCITRAL  provides for a Legislative Guide which contains comprehensive themes on the 
objectives and principles that should be reflected in a State's insolvency laws.143 The Legislative 
Guide is intended to guide insolvency law reform around the world, and provides a tool for 
legislative institutions to utilize in developing legislation, regulations and policies, or when 
reviewing the adequacy of existing laws, regulations and policies. The Legislative Guide provides 
one of the important approaches which relate to the rules for the appointments of insolvency 
representatives.144 
4.3.1  The Insolvency Representative 
The insolvency representative plays a central role in the effective and efficient implementation of 
an insolvency laws. The insolvency representative has certain powers over debtors and their assets, 
a duty to protect those assets and their value, and the interests of creditors and employees, as well 
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as to ensure that the law is applied effectively and impartially.145 In accordance with these 
sentiments, it is essential that the insolvency representative be appropriately qualified and possess 
the knowledge, experience and personal qualities that will ensure not only the effective and 
efficient conduct of the proceedings but also that there is confidence in the insolvency regime.146 
The Legislative Guide recommends the following regarding the provisions relating to the 
insolvency representative: 
(a) The provisions concerning the purpose of the legislation in relation to the insolvency 
representative must provide that  it is to: 
 specify the qualifications required for appointment;  
 establish a mechanism for selection and appointment;  
 specify powers and functions; and  
 provide for remuneration, liability, removal and replacement.147 
 
(b) In terms of the provisions pertaining to qualifications of insolvency representatives, it is 
required that the legislation specifies the qualifications and qualities required for 
appointment as an insolvency representative, including integrity, independence, 
impartiality, requisite knowledge of relevant commercial law and experience in 
commercial and business matters. The insolvency law should also specify the grounds upon 
which a proposed insolvency representative may be disqualified from appointment.148 
 
(c) With regard to the provisions for the appointment of insolvency practitioners, it is required 
that the insolvency laws should establish a mechanism for the selection and appointment 
of an insolvency representative. A further recommendation is made with regards to the 
difference approaches that may be adopted, which includes, the appointment by the court; 
appointment by an independent appointing authority; appointment on the basis of a 
recommendation by creditors or the creditor committee; appointment by the debtor; or 
appointment by operation of insolvency law, where the insolvency representative is a 
government or administrative agency or official.149 (emphasis added) 
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(d) The Legislative Guide further makes provision for a model for the removal and placement 
of an insolvency practitioner. It states that the insolvency laws should establish the grounds 
and procedure for removal of the insolvency representative and must lists a number of 
possible grounds for removal.150  
It is important to note that other countries adopt various systems to regulate the appointment of 
insolvency representatives. In the United Kingdom, only a licensed insolvency practitioner is 
authorised to act in relation to formal insolvency procedures, and they can be appointed in a 
number of ways. The route by which a practitioner is appointed varies according to the insolvency 
procedure being followed. Appointments could be made via a meeting of creditors, by the courts 
if a winding-up order has been granted, or by the Secretary of State if the official receiver so 
requests.151 
4.4 Considerations of South African insolvency laws against the international standards  
It has been suggested that developing a regulatory regime suitable for a developing country comes 
with challenges considering the various factors that influence a country’s legal system.152 
According to Calitz, there are various factors which influence a country’s insolvency system, and 
include, political and governmental; economic and commercial; as well as cultural and social as 
major factors. All these factors need to be balanced against the international best practices.153 Apart 
from these factors, other important considerations in South Africa are the constitutional 
imperatives that have a phenomenal influence in the South African insolvency law. The 
Constitution  requires that all legislative reforms be aligned with the Constitution.154 One of the 
key themes of the Constitution is the achievement of equality and the prevention of unfair 
discrimination.155 It is suggested that any measure taken by government in order to effect 
transformation must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution.156 Various sections of the 
Constitution provide guidance for the remedial measures that government must adopt during 
policy formulation in order to correct the inequalities that existed in the past.157 In this vein, it is 
submitted that the strategies adopted to guide the appointment processes should be aligned with 
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the constitutional imperatives and should also balance governmental objectives with international 
standards.   
4.5 A comparison of the South African regulatory system with the nternational standards 
In an attempt to reform the insolvency legislation, the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development in consultation with various stakeholders started working on the Draft Insolvency 
Bill which is intended to revise the law of insolvency in South Africa and the statutory provisions 
dealing with the liquidation of companies, bringing them in line with international best 
practices.158 The Bill seeks to modernise the insolvency regulatory framework, and contains 
certain propositions that are similar to those recommended by the international best practices. One 
of the important propositions in the Bill is the establishment of a statutory body for insolvency 
practitioners, and that all the practitioners be registered with the council.159  Since the Bill has not 
been promulgated, in its current form, it is a mere wish list for the South African insolvency reform. 
Nonetheless, the propositions in the Bill serve an important example of a desirable system that the 
South African insolvency profession desires. This part of the study compares the regulatory aspects 
of insolvency practitioners to international standards. 
As has been mentioned above, the South African insolvency profession is regulated by the state 
through various legislations.160 According to Cassim, this form of regulation is referred to as the 
state regulation, and further identifies other modes of regulation, such as self-regulation and co-
regulation. Self-regulation comprises of private professional bodies regulating the insolvency 
practitioners, and co-regulation refers to a joint regulation by the state and private professional 
bodies.161 The Principles does not emphasize on the type of a regulatory system, however, 
emphasizes on the independence of a supervisory body. While the South African insolvency 
system is strongly regulated by the state, it is submitted that, this regulatory method does maintain 
some sort of independence from individual insolvency representatives, and to a certain extent, 
meets the international standards envisaged in Principle D7.162 The international instruments 
further emphasize on the competency and integrity of the insolvency practitioners, that the 
legislation should specify the qualifications of practitioners; provide for a criteria to be utilized 
when selecting  the insolvency practitioner; and that such criteria must be objective, clearly 
                                                          
158 Loubser “An international perspective on the regulation of insolvency practitioners” 2007 SAMLJ 123. The Bill is 
currently at the Master’s office in the Department of Justice and Correctional Services. 
159 n 158 above. 
160 See par 2.1 above. 
161 Cassim (n 24) 5 
162 See par 4.1.1 above. Principles D7 provide that, the supervisory bodies regulating and supervising the insolvency 
representatives should be independent of individual representatives. 
30 
 
established and publicly available.163 It is submitted that the various systems utilized in the 
Master’s office are not clearly established as they lack the legal base. It is further submitted that 
those systems, in particular, the Ministerial Policy failed to provide a qualification standard in 
order for a practitioner to be appointment. Although, the current legislation makes provision for 
disqualifications, it fails to provide for qualifications.  
4.6  Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the current appointment practices in South Africa do not 
comply with the international best practices. Despite the international practices’ emphasis on the 
competency of the insolvency practitioners, it is submitted that the system that must be developed 
to regulate the appointment processes should also provide for mechanisms for transfer of such 
skills to inexperienced insolvency practitioners. Academics have suggested a series of 
recommendations that could improve and reform the regulatory structure of the South African 
insolvency law. It is suggested that the appointments system should set out a criteria for the 
minimum level of entry qualifications, manner for skills transfer, method for accountability of 
practitioners, amongst others.164  
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5 Criticism against the previous and current systems for appointments of insolvency 
practitioners 
5.1 Introduction  
The attempts to keep up with the developments in terms of the legislative framework by 
introducing the various appointment mechanisms proved dissatisfactory in several respects. One 
of the disadvantages common in the Master’s panel, the Requisition system and the Ministerial 
Policies were that these systems lacked the legal status.165 These systems also presented 
irregularities such as corruption, fronting practices, not taking into account the interests of 
creditors, and more importantly, lack of proper skills transfer mechanisms.166 In certain instances, 
these systems have been found to limit the Master’s discretion. It is also submitted that the 
inadequacy of resources in the Master’s office, and the absence of a proper and valid framework 
for skills transfer, determination of experience and qualifications required for the insolvency 
practitioner to be appointed is a big pitfall in the appointment process. 
5.2 Problems regarding the Statutory criteria for appointments  
Section 18 of the Insolvency Act and section 368 of the Companies Act are one of the contentious 
provisions prescribing the criteria for appointments. What is noticeable in these provisions is the 
wording “may” which, according to academics, suggests that the appointments were not intended 
to be made in all instances, but in extraordinary circumstances.167 Although the two sections are 
worded similar, on the contrary, section 368 differs in that it makes a provision that the person 
ought to be appointed must be a “suitable person”. Calitz and Burdette suggests that a suitable 
person refers to an independent person who is able to discharge the responsibilities of such office 
competently, honestly and impartially.168 Academics who have written on the aspects of section 18 
and section 368 maintain that the legislature did not elaborate on the criteria that must be adopted 
when making appointments.169 The legislation merely prescribes that there must be an instrument 
to guide the appointment process; further that such an instrument must be designed by the 
Minister.170 It is submitted that the legislative provisions leave the task with the Minister who must 
consider the problems in the current appointment process and establish a policy to address those 
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problems. Until the Minister acts on determining a valid policy, it is further submitted that the 
Master cannot make any appointments in terms of section 18, section 57 and section 368. The 
absence of a criteria for appointments leaves the Master with a wide discretion to make 
appointments in any manner deemed fit using the non-statutory processes.  
5.3 Problems relating to the Master’s unguided discretion 
The statutory provisions mentioned above allow the Master to exercise a discretion on whether or 
not to appoint a practitioner. Whereas the Master’s discretionary powers in the appointment 
process were affirmed in Ex Parte Master,171 it has also been suggested that a wide discretion 
capable of infringing on the fundamental rights ought to be accompanied by a criteria or guidelines 
to guide its exercise.172 On this note, it is submitted that, the absence of a criteria to guide the 
appointment processes places the office of the Master in a more vulnerable position. The Master 
is exposed to litigation challenges questioning the lawfulness of his decisions, and allegations of 
improper exercise of his discretionary powers.173 It is submitted that, the lack of sufficient capacity 
and resources in the Master’s office may result in an omission of important facts regarding the 
estate which may lead to an improper exercise of the Master’s discretion on whether or not to 
appoint a practitioner. 
 
5.4  Problems relating to the Master’s panel  
 
The Master’s panel was criticised on the basis that it did not have a statutory base. The Master had 
the discretionary power to appoint and remove the appointees who were unsuitable at his 
discretion. It is important to note that the appointment or removal of the candidates from the list 
not only had an effect on the rights of the candidate removed but also to creditors of the insolvent 
estate. Another point of concern with the Master’s panel was the fact that each Master’s office had 
a different method of operation. Each Master’s office had its own list and appointment criteria. 
This method of operation continued until a Master’s Directive was issued as an attempt seeking to 
integrate all the active practitioners into a National register.174 The respective provinces still 
maintain a discretion to appoint the PDIs.175 It is submitted that this opens a pitfall in the 
appointment process in that there could be a lack of consistency in the appointments process of 
PDIs.  
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5.5 Problems relating to the Requisition system 
 
Apart from criticism that the Requisition system had no legal base, it was also criticised on the 
basis that it fettered the Master’s discretion since the Master had to appoint according to the 
nominations made by creditors.176 According to Burdette and Calitz, the Master had always viewed 
the requisitions as a guide to make appointments, not that the Master must strictly appoint 
according to the majority votes of creditors.177 It is further suggested that it can hardly be said that 
the Master exercises any discretion if he has to rely on the nominations made by creditors.178 There 
were also other criticisms with the Requisition system as pointed out by Calitz and Burdette, that 
the requisitions were not made under oath; and they encouraged touting amongst insolvency 
practitioners in that creditors are actively canvased for their support in the 48 hours following the 
granting of the order.179 It is further pointed out that there is no credible system at the Master’s 
office for monitoring the submissions of requisitions which often results in submitted requisitions 
being lost in the system.180 Furthermore, there is no way of verifying the requisitions that are 
submitted in the 48 hours period, which allegedly results in false requisitions being submitted. 
Academics also point out other irregularities in the requisition system, such as the submission of 
false requisitions, and the duplication of requisitions in various estates, and that the requisitions 
were not made under oath, amongst others.181 Lastly, the criticism largely point to the fact that the 
Requisition system is informal, and has no legal status. 
 
5.6 Problems regarding the Ministerial Policies and Strategies 
 
Although the Ministerial Policies were seen to portray a virtuous cause, it is submitted that they 
lacked a number of important characteristics required for an effective insolvency regime. The main 
issues which surfaced in the Ministerial Policies were that they limited the Master’s discretion in 
that the Master had to appoint the PDIs in accordance with these Policies.182 Burdette and Calitz 
also point out that the system for appointments of PDIs was full of irregularities such as fronting 
practices and corruption, and lacked the skills transfer mechanism.183 One main concern with the 
Policy document was that the legislative amendments required that the policy for appointment of 
insolvency practitioners be approved by Parliament. These Policies were not approved by 
                                                          
176 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 447. 
177 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 447. 
178 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 447. 
179 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 735. 
180 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 447 and 448. 
181 Calitz and Burdette (n 6) 735. 
182 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 449. 
183 Burdette and Calitz (n 14) 448. 
34 
 
Parliament. While one of the main aims of the Policies was to transform the insolvency profession 
and make it inclusive of PDIs, the 2001 Policy did not recognise white women as PDIs.184 
Moreover, the experienced practitioners resented to train the PDIs. As a result, the Ministerial 
Policies failed to provide for the transfer of skills set to PDIs, and defeated the objectives they 
aimed to achieve.  
 
5.7 Conclusion  
 
It is submitted that the current regulatory framework for the appointment of insolvency 
practitioners is not adequate to regulate and address the challenges in the insolvency industry. As 
it stands, the South African insolvency sector does not have a formal system for appointment of 
insolvency practitioners. Notwithstanding the developments that were made in terms of legislation 
prescribing the establishment of a policy, it has taken more than decade for the Minister to 
determine such a Policy. Notwithstanding that the Policy failed,  it stands to be seen whether the 
new Policy design will consider the challenges encountered in the current appointment system and 
whether that policy will be aligned to the international best practices. 
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6 Conclusion and Recommendations for consideration by policy makers 
 
In view of the criticisms highlighted in the preceding chapter, it is submitted that the South African 
system for appointment of insolvency practitioners is characterised by inefficiencies, and that there 
is no reason why the inefficiencies cannot be changed. It was pointed out above, that developing 
an efficient insolvency system is not an easy task considering the various factors affecting the 
South African insolvency environment.185 It is submitted that those factors should not be perceived 
as a permanent obstacle towards the efforts to develop an efficient insolvency system. New 
strategies to improve the current insolvency system for appointments of insolvency practitioners 
should be determined. On that note, while the Policy is awaited, this study recommends that the 
Minister should act speedily in the revision process of such a Policy. The Policy should aim to 
address the imbalances that exists in the insolvency profession, and should encompass sufficient 
measures to, amongst others, transform the insolvency profession to be more inclusive of PDIs, 
address skills transfer, consider creditor participation in the appointment processes, and more 
importantly, the Policy should be capable to guide the Master’s discretion, not constrain it.  
 
It is recommended that in order to ensure that the Policy achieves its aims, it is necessary that a 
proper measure for the transfer of skills from the experienced insolvency practitioners to the PDIs 
be formulated. The system should make it mandatory that the experienced practitioners train the 
PDIs appointed in an estate. It was pointed out above, that the current system whereby the PDIs 
are appointed as co-trustees and co-liquidators has its imperfections; however, certain features of 
that system can be utilised in the Policy revision as a model on how the PDIs are catered for.  
 
The new Policy should have regard of the fact that the South African insolvency law has 
traditionally been, and is still regarded as, a pro-creditor system.186 In designing the Policy, the 
Minister should consider the fundamental purpose of the insolvency legislation which is to bring 
about a concursus creditorum and to protect the interest of creditors.187 It is noteworthy that the 
principles that encompass creditor participation in the appointment process are echoed in the Draft 
Insolvency Bill which is in transit to Parliament.188 If the Bill is adopted, it will have an impact on 
the Master’s position with regards to appointments of practitioners as the Bill places a great 
emphasis on creditors to elect a practitioner of their choice, and the Master must appoint such a 
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person.189 Notably, the Master still maintains a discretion in cases where there was no nomination 
by creditors.  
 
It is also recommended that the Policy should provide, as one of the requirements for appointments, 
that the insolvency practitioners must be members in good standing of professional bodies; further 
that such bodies be affiliated with the statutory regulatory body.190 It is noted that at present, there 
are professional bodies such as SARIPA191. Calitz suggests that those bodies would go a long way 
if they were provided with statutory backing.192 Loubser suggests that the provisions relating to 
disqualification of practitioners who are not members of the professional body recognized by the 
Minister be included in the Draft Insolvency Bill.193 It is important to note that these propositions 
are similar to what is already provided for in terms of the Companies Act, 2008 with regard to the 
appointment of business rescue practitioners.194 
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